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Shake the flour can, get the particles.
You lift the rod one inch too far, and the core’s crazy, you’re 
plastered on account of the ceiling.
   —Mac Wellman’s Cellophane
By the time Marjorie Perloff would write the foreword to the 2001 Cellophane: 
Plays by Mac Wellman, she would note that, in addition to Bertolt Brecht, Samuel 
Beckett, Sam Shepard, and Harold Pinter, Mac Wellman also “recalls . . . the 
language poets–Bruce Andrews, Charles Bernstein, Steve McCaffery–who are his 
contemporaries.”1 Wellman, a prolific experimental playwright, has corresponded 
with Bernstein at least since 1977,2 and among Wellman’s extensive bicoastal 
associates is the Language poet Douglas Messerli, founder of Sun and Moon Press 
of Los Angeles. Wellman, described as a “language” writer by New York Times 
reviewer Mel Gussow in 1990,3 is identified as a Language poet in 2008 by Helen 
Shaw in her foreword to Wellman’s third major play collection. Shaw writes that 
Wellman “has been the deconstructionists’ mountaintop; he has read the very 
choppy tablets given down by the Black Mountain gang and the Language Poets 
(he is one). But he also returns to us [in the theatre] with their message.”4 Shaw’s 
identification of Wellman as a Language poet in no way diminishes his importance 
in the theatre, although his first plays were radio plays adapted from his poetry, 
and his dramatic works, always off-beat, suggest his “poetical” preoccupation 
with producing unconventional and emphatically non-didactic effects through 
linguistic and theatrical means. His plays have appeared in New York and on the 
West Coast since the late 1970s, when he was quickly successful in winning grants 
and awards for his plays, as well as forming important theatre relationships. The 
one with En Garde Arts director Anne Hamburger led to the site-specific plays 
Crowbar, at the Victory Theatre on Broadway, and Bad Penny at Bow Bridge, in 
Central Park. Wellman and composer David Lang collaborated on The Difficulty 
of Crossing a Field. Collections of Wellman’s plays have been published by major 
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academic presses, among them Johns Hopkins University Press and University of 
Minnesota Press. His prominence as a playwright rose in the mid- to late 1980s 
with bicoastal productions and important notice in the New York Times and in 
American Theatre magazine, and publication in Yale’s Theater journal of his first 
manifesto (“The Theatre of Good Intentions”) attacking middlebrow theatre. The 
study which follows focuses on two of three plays associated with an experiment 
in “bad writing,” Cellophane and Terminal Hip, that stand apart in Wellman’s 
always-experimental drama as his most sustained use of nonsense to produce 
non-meaningful effects. Less will be said about Three Americanisms, the third 
play in the bad-writing series, which takes a new direction. However, all three of 
these plays demonstrate Wellman’s strong affinity with Language poetry, which 
emerges most clearly in them just as deconstruction and chaos theory are becoming 
conversant with one another.
While the Language poets, who emerged in the late 1970s, are a heterogeneous 
group,5 they have tended to be politically progressive, theory-driven, and 
modernist in their self-definition. This modernism registers in Charles Bernstein’s 
1992 declaration that “[w]e can act: we are not trapped in the postmodern 
condition if we are willing to differentiate between works of art that suggest new 
ways of conceiving our present world and those that seek rather to debunk any 
possibilities of meaning.”6 At the same time, the Language poets eschew binary 
and linear thinking, and have absorbed deconstruction in their poetry and their 
theories. 
By way of a notion of the deconstructive “general economy” of language, 
Bernstein and McCaffery agree that forms of expression (letters, words, images, 
sounds, gestures–language in its materiality) are of a completely different order 
from the institutions (contents of expression) in which they are situated or the 
official narratives (forms of content) with which their writing is engaged. These 
ideas derive from Georges Bataille and also from the Copenhagen linguist Louis 
Hjelmslev.7 Bernstein and McCaffery agree that meaning elides the materiality 
of expression to “refer to” (or to produce the look of) a stable order of reality 
and that in the postmodern, as power’s meaningful repetitions (or reifications) 
have saturated everyday life, they must resist power by reasserting the materiality 
of expression. Unless poetry resists reproducing the “natural” correspondence 
of expression with content, it would be, like ideologically complicit academic 
verse,8 part of the problem. Bernstein’s goal is, he writes, “to throw a wedge into 
this engineered process of social derealization.”9 The Language poet’s goal for 
cognition and understanding has been, George Hartley explained in 1989, “baring 
the frame” of the “production of meaning through the syntactical organization of 
force.”10
Wellman is equally committed to asserting the materiality of expression in 
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its spoken, written, and theatrical forms. He wrote in 1984 that “[a]rtists and 
thinkers of our time are engaged in a war against . . . the tyrannical domination 
of meanings so fixed, so absolute, as to render the means of meaning, which is to 
say the heart and soul of meaning, a mere phantom.”11 Wellman, Bernstein, and 
McCaffery all have resisted the institutions of their genres while producing, as a 
kind of surplus value, a powerful affect that can be simultaneously alienating and 
absorbing for readers and spectators, at least for those who are not merely alienated 
by the strangeness of some of their work. In ordinary life, affect is an unformed 
feeling that lasts for half a second: it takes a half second for a stimulus response 
to form affect into an emotion and a direction within the frames of perception 
and meaning.12 One effect of Language writing is to extend that half second for 
the duration of the performance. The Language writer achieves this when his or 
her forms of expression keep the spectator at the border between meaning and 
nonsense. In ways that I will develop below, this is the border where meanings 
that leap into view are overwhelmed by meanings and nonmeaning in the next 
instant. This is the border between meaning, formed as a restrictive economy and 
lost in an instant, and the general economy of language.
The relationship between the general economy as a flow of language 
expression is staged in this model as a relationship of nonrelation with a restrictive 
economy, which constrains that flow of expression according to the contents of 
expression, understood as expressive modes and conduits that conform to forms of 
content, understood as the ideological order. Meaning expresses that ideological 
order and, as expression, recedes into the background as language refers itself to 
objects in the world. However, a practice that exploits the gap between expression 
and the ideological order to foreground the nonrelation of expression to this order 
is one that returns expression to the general economy and leaves the spectator at 
its threshold in an affective state of intensity.
The affective state of intensity can be apprehended, as I will show in comparing 
two of Wellman’s plays, Cellophane and Terminal Hip, to Language poetry. But 
beyond describing the state itself we enter immediately into a host of problems 
accounting for the connections, if any, among authorial intentions, audience 
response, and critical interpretation. My purpose here is to explain the production 
of the affective state, but it is also to engage, if tentatively, with the theories that 
inspire these uses of language. With the Language poets, Wellman among them, 
this requires elaborating some important theoretical linkages. Wellman’s embrace, 
in the early 1990s, of chaos theory is compatible with the deconstructive language 
practices so far described, if we are to understand the singular enunciation as a 
convergence of different systems (forms of expression, contents of expression, and 
forms of content) in relations of nonrelation. The convergence of these systems 
forms a complex interaction of constraints, producing new potential for variation 
within a more complex system. Theoretically this convergence of constraints and 
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potentials, in the singular enunciation, produces unpredictable effects, potentially 
at different scales. N. Katherine Hayles writes that deconstruction and chaos theory, 
deriving as they do from the same episteme, had come, by the early 1990s, into 
productive conversation with one another.13 It is no surprise then that Wellman, a 
fellow traveler of the Language poets, should make his “chaos theory turn” at this 
moment, especially as he was, like Tom Stoppard, under the influence of James 
Gleick’s 1988 book Chaos: Making a New Science.14 Hayles’s point about the 
cultural importance of chaos at the time had to do with its appropriation, by cultural 
critics and artists, as a new way of conceiving and deconstructing the edifices of 
power. For artists and critics (if not for scientists), the ideas associated with chaos 
theory gave new credibility to nonrational and nonlinear ways of conceiving the 
world.15 
William W. Demastes, writing of the “theatre of chaos,” remarks that “chaos 
as a paradigm is revolutionary because it asks us to see the world from a different 
metaphorical stance. It is the metaphor that hits the mark in ways others to varying 
degrees have not. In fact, often chaos is quite literal and not metaphorical at 
all.”16 But here I will say that in drama, it is not the metaphorical chaos allegories 
like Stoppard’s Arcadia and Wellman’s Cat’s Paw, but Wellman’s chaotic, 
nonmetaphorically effective plays Cellophane and Terminal Hip that, owing to the 
interplay of expressions and contents, present the chaotic phenomena upon which 
chaotic Language writing is to be theorized. Theoretically, our route through the 
Language poets is the straightest route from Wellman’s language practice, consisting 
in the production of affective intensity, to an understanding of the relevance of his 
invocations of chaos theory. 
The Radioactivity of Language
There is, of course, no escaping meaning, and even cognate lexemes are 
“radioactive” with meanings, including connotations, which carry their emotional 
charge. In discussions of poetic nonsense in the last decade many have begun, 
as does Perloff, with reference to Gertrude Stein, for whom “nonsense” is not 
the absence of meaning, but the frustration of a total system in which some 
meanings are advanced and others repressed. Perloff writes, “But words, as even 
Gertrude Stein recognized, have meanings, and the only way to MAKE IT NEW 
is not to pretend that meaning doesn’t exist but to take words out of their usual 
contexts and create new relationships among them.”17 When the Language poet 
James Sherry complains that poetry’s “old forms are radioactive with the half-
lives that constructed them,’”18 or when, in a similar vein (referring to Bernstein’s 
“business poems”), Perloff writes that “the pieces of the puzzle are always already 
contaminated, bearing, as they do, the traces of the media discourses . . . in which 
they are embedded,”19 “radioactivity” is understood as the toxicity of words, 
official discourses, and outmoded forms. One cannot detoxify language; one can, 
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however, exploit this toxic radioactivity by raising its kinetic level. Although 
Bernstein is no ideologue, he understands ideology as highly useful for producing 
what he would consider nonideological effects: he writes that “[i]deology . . . 
everywhere informs poetry and imparts to it, at its most resonant, a density of 
materialized social being expressed through the music of the work as well as 
its multifoliate references.” The connotations–investments and repudiations–
surrounding culturally and/or politically freighted buzz words and scare words 
carry their histories with them: they are radioactive with those histories and lend 
their intensities to the musical flow of language. That Bernstein values mostly the 
intensification of fragmentary ideological reference is registered in his statement 
about the poetry scene of the early 1990s: “[t]he state of American poetry can be 
characterized by the sharp ideological disagreements that lacerate our communal 
field of action, making it volatile, dynamic, engaging.”20
For Wellman, ideological meaning is also, in itself, “worthless, as are the 
foundations of knowledge.”21 In the early 1980s, Wellman appears to have un-
derstood reification in its larger ideological forms even as he filled his plays with 
small breaks in the flow of the action, including non sequiturs and other surprises. 
Ideology was associated in these earlier plays with characters whose modes of 
thought, owing to the reifications in society, were not fully engaged with reality. 
Wellman himself explains that his 1983 Bad Infinity was the conclusion of a five-
play series (including Energumen, Diseases of the Well-Dressed, The Professional 
Frenchman, and The Self-Begotten)22 in which he was interested in contemporary 
“logic,”23 and we see that this final play features a more or less static Chekhovian 
lineup of “thinkers”: the affectless (postmodern) artist John Sleight; the messianic 
Megan; the sentimental bourgeois murderer Ramon; Deborah, a spirit of negation; 
and Sam, the anarchosocialist (modernist) artist. A countersign to this postmodern 
disengagement from history was the philosopher Hegel. In Wellman’s plays of the 
early 1980s, the Hegelian dialectic (dialectics in its “nonideological” form) does 
not operate well, owing to the reifications Bernstein and others have identified. 
If in Hegelian terms “spirit” must engage with history as necessity in order to 
transcend itself in a new synthesis, then history must be available in some more 
concrete way. Wellman, describing his work as “affective fantasy,” blames “a 
refusal to accept any kind of dialectic in the workings of society” for “the strange 
malaise in our playwriting.”24 This is an aspect of a simulacral condition Wellman 
thematizes as the Hegelian “bad infinity” where, owing to postmodern reifications, 
spirit (desire, creativity) can get no traction in its nonencounter with history (or 
necessity): the synthesis of the dialectical process does not take place.25 Or, more 
in keeping with Bernstein,26 Wellman’s dialectic may correspond more fully with 
Theodor Adorno’s negative dialectics. According to Adorno, a “successful work . . 
. is not one which resolves objective contradictions in a spurious harmony, but one 
which expresses the idea of harmony negatively by embodying the contradictions, 
74                                                               Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
pure and uncompromised, in its innermost structure.”27 In this case, while there 
is no escape from the bad infinity of the modern world, art may, through means 
of embodiment that eschew meaning, offer a more vital engagement with the bad 
infinity of postmodern reification. Hartley writes that “[i]t is the achievement of 
many Language poets to think beyond the stalemate of the paradigmatic question 
[of meaning and ideology] and to pose poetry as an exploration of the syntagmatic. 
. . . The role of poetry thus shifts from denying to revealing, unveiling, discovery.”28 
It is their achievement, that is, to exploit the radioactivity of language, which, for 
Hartley, is to engage “dialectically” with the individual sign and sequence of signs 
to produce from these a “negative” but ultimately affirmative complexity.
Extending his concern with dialectics into the writing of work more like 
Language poetry itself, Wellman took up, a year later in 1984, his experiment in 
“bad writing,” which carried on for over two years29 alongside the writing and 
production of plays like Dracula (1987) and Whirligig (1988). The bad-writing 
experiment resulted in Cellophane and Terminal Hip, and a later third play, Three 
Americanisms, which is the only one of the three indebted to Gleick’s book. 
The bad-writing plays, essentially Language poems, are the clearest connection 
between Wellman’s art and that of the Language poets. In ways I will develop, 
they are the most chaotic of his plays, so much so that only the most provisional 
interpretations may be offered by one always fearful of “[b]ark[ing] up the 
wrong tree.”30 For example, provisional interpretation might suggest that the 
combination, across the field of writing from which Cellophane and Terminal 
Hip derive, of the Eliotic wasteland, Whitman’s self-song in the grass, Roethke’s 
“fragile” “Edenic pastoralism,”31 and no doubt other intertexts besides suggests 
a tortuous relationship between the self and nature, a troubled connection 
to the poetic tradition, and even the old affirmation, across a field of garbage 
(environmental, cultural, political). By way of the ubiquitous letters “X” and “Y” 
(almost always readable as syntax’s x-axis and grammar’s y-axis, respectively), 
the writing and reading of poetry, including the violence of interpretation to the 
poem’s syntactical flow, are also suggested.
To focus briefly on the individual plays, a reading of Terminal Hip may 
justify Wellman’s claim that he was seeking religious meaning, but not in the 
West. Terminal Hip may owe its “structure” (or vague mimicry of signs that, read 
together, recall a narrative, perhaps the “ghostly narrative” Wellman mentions32) 
to Walt Whitman’s “Song of Myself” in Leaves of Grass, a poem structured in turn 
on the career of Christ. Wellman told David Savran that, in the bad-writing plays, 
he “wasn’t trying to make any sense or tell a story” but that he “found certain 
patterns emerging. I found a sort of lofty poetic line developing that reminded me 
of Whitman.”33 While in the play’s conclusion “a panda ghost sinks to the center 
of the world and sits there and sings,” several pages earlier he has recalled the 
crucifixion (Whitman’s “Corpses rise, gashes heal, fastenings roll from me. / I 
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troop forth replenish’d with supreme power . . .” [969-70]) when he writes:
How he on X feigned Y, hounded the Savior all his days, inspired 
his Xification, got Him no gumballs, derided him in His final 
agony, gambled for His garments at the foot of the cross, the 
whole kit and kaboodle. Philip Botely shows symptoms of X. 
Philip Boxley has not been vaccinated against hypofluvia.
We see here the appropriation of Christ’s passion to “X,” which is identified, 
never more clearly than here, with syntactical “hypofluvia” or flow. Then, back at 
the beginning of the poem-play, there are lines like “Men like signs. Signs make 
sense of things” (Whitman’s “Or I guess [the grass] is a uniform hieroglyphic” 
[106]). And moving forward, as does Whitman’s speaker (“It is time to explain 
myself—let us stand up” [1134]): “Gotta move sideways, all balled up like so. . . . 
Moving sideways to escape detection.” And there is, of course, the pervasive hint 
of betrayal (Whitman’s “They have left me helpless to a red marauder” [635]): 
“Pay off X in the name of Y, advance career through artful changes.”34
Like that of Terminal Hip, the conclusion of Cellophane also echoes the 
conclusion of another poem to alert one retrospectively to other quotations and 
echoes: this time it is T. S. Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” (“We 
have lingered in the chambers of the sea / By sea-girls wreathed in seaweed red 
and brown” [129-30]). Wellman writes: “Limos in limo heaven, with little limo 
wings./Burning limos, in limo holocaust O aer./Dreaming limos at the bottom 
of the sea. In the first part, “From Mad Tomatoes,” there is a dramatic structure 
consisting of the speaker, generally identified by the verb form “am”; a “you,” 
which “am” berates and lectures (Prufrock’s “Let us go then, you and I” [Line 1]); 
and the “labernath,” which is a powerful liar. “Wow that labernath!” the speaker 
says, and “Who as has the labernath him do all,” but the labernath cannot be 
trusted: “You go aks at him labernath. / They tell you some crowe. / They tell 
you some indeed crowe.” The labernath may be associated with “at cat,” which 
seems to me to suggest a condition of displacement, dissonance, and alienation, 
a common condition (“We all was / At cat”) which might have been avoided: “it 
mighta could if we all hadda been / of one mind.” Perhaps owing to the labernath 
and the condition of being at cat, the “Mad Tomatoes” denouement seems to 
consist of Eliot’s dead crossing London Bridge, not in “Prufrock” but in The 
Waste Land: “The X’s. / The Y’s. / Came across in and out. / All / At cat like 
they knew,” and the upshot is “Longtime looksee allatime at zero am.” Is this the 
zero-degree of the “affectless” postmodern world? Meanwhile language becomes 
thematized by the play of binaries. At cat as “not once at dog am,”35 suggesting 
the Saussurean description of binary signifiers and its legacy in poststructural 
difference: in contradiction to “at dog,” “at cat” forms a signifier; as a singular 
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signified, “cat” is distinguished from the pack animal signified by “dog”: we are 
operating on social and linguistic levels, and perhaps others besides, to suggest a 
condition of—what, anomie? Entropy? Postmodernity? Countercultural failure? 
The breakdown of the Cold War consensus? The nature of a Language poem? 
Signs are selected and arranged to evoke questions about patterns of meaning, but 
these questions go unanswered.
Cellophane’s next part, “From Hollowness,” continues to gesture toward 
meanings relating to environmental damage and also to a loss of meaning and 
spirituality. With respect to the American landscape, this section is filled with 
scenes of devastation and, in Part 2, it is hard not to associate the polluted 
river, “Cellophane wrapers all the way to the bank,” not only with the Thames 
of The Waste Land, but also with the Cuyahoga River flowing into Lake Erie 
through Cleveland (“Heaps of industrial hooha all the way, yeah! To the bank. 
Yeah!”), Wellman’s home town, which was so filled with chemicals that in 1969 
it caught fire (“All the same on fire shall have did am. / By the dump all the way 
to the bank”). Here it is easy to see the slide from effects (dumps, river fires) to 
causes (industrialization, banks). With respect to the cultural and the political, 
“labernath” is a highly ambiguous figure, which could refer to the Borgesian 
labyrinth or the Language poem. “From ’S Sake,” the play’s third part, suggests 
that God, the author-god or god-the-subject is missing. However, for the first time 
in Cellophane, we encounter the word “I,” both in reference to Jesus (“I am the 
way, Jesus said, and the light and the life”) and in reference perhaps to the speaker: 
“I don’t know who I am. . . . I am thoroughly at sea in the weariness of prolonged 
political emptiness.” This mode is much more confessional and metacritical if 
we keep our focus on a linguistic relationship between X and Y: “[a] well-oiled 
insoluable conundrum transfixes X in the name of Y while down the road some 
man is trying to find Y′ in the crowe’s eye strange.” That is, a personal resolution 
can be effected by being the man down the road looking for meaning in the crow’s 
eye, here Y-prime or a meaning displaced from the meaning offered by power. Or, 
on the contrary, the man may encounter the lying “crowe” which turned up earlier 
in the play. Associated with expression’s escape from power, here there may be an 
affirmation of the syntactical: “For X belongs”: “X to Y / X′ to somewheres they 
told of once in error. . . . X upon the uncharted road. / X on the move forever the 
blue the gasp the.” Parts 3 and 4 introduce a “he” and “she” and, by the beginning 
of Part 5 (right on schedule?), “am” seems to be, or to have become, “Fortune’s 
basket case”36—to echo what Megan, in The Bad Infinity, refers to as Romeo and 
Juliet’s “old-hat dead language.”37 In other words, there seems to be some struggle 
involving a man and a woman and perhaps even a crisis. But those outlines appear 
only erratically, if at all.
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The Paragram and the General Economy
To the foregoing remarks about Cellophane and Terminal Hip, Bernstein 
would say that “[t]he obvious problem is that the poem said in any other way is 
not the poem”:
. . . think only
of the undercurrent of anagrammatical
transformations, the semantic contribution of
the visual representation of the text, the
particular associations evoked by the phonic
configurations. These features are related to the
“nonsemantic” effects that Forrest-Thomson
describes as contributing toward the “total image-complex”
of the poem.38
Here Bernstein is describing what Steve McCaffery calls the “paragram” as a 
form of expression:
For while assignable to a certain order of production [content 
of expression], value, and meaning [form of content], the 
paragram [does] not derive necessarily from an intentionality 
or conscious rhetoricity and seem[s] an inevitable consequence 
of writing’s alphabetic, combinatory nature. Seen this way as 
emerging from the multiple ruptures that alphabetic components 
bring to virtuality, meaning becomes partly the production of 
a general economy, a persistent excess, nonintentionality, and 
expenditure without reserve through writing’s component 
letters.
There is no transparency to language and meaning, and the production of meaning, 
owing to forms of, and even contents of, expression, is always already partly 
engaged in the production of nonsense, or the flow of the general economy of 
language. Or again as McCaffery puts it, the paragram is
that aspect of language which escapes all discourse and which 
commits writing unavoidably to a general economy and to the 
transphenomenal paradox of an unpresentability that serves as 
a necessary condition of writing’s capacity to present. All of 
this suggests a constitutional nonpresence in meaning itself.39
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Because the production of meaning is always also the production of elements and 
effects that are nonmeaningful, there is no meaning that is not also paragrammatic 
to a certain degree. The Language poets in their texts and performances and 
Wellman in his plays—the bad-writing plays especially—are merely directing 
their energies more than usual to the paragrammatic aspect of language and 
performance.
Again, an interpretive descriptive procedure elides the actual process of 
reception, reading, and spectatorship. This process is chaotic, at least until the 
text is brought to order through the exercise of reading strategies. I will suggest 
that Wellman’s lines have an important affinity with Bernstein’s poetic practice. 
McCaffery quotes a 1979 text by Bernstein, which, while less readable than 
Wellman’s text, operates in a similar way:
Ig ak abberflappi. mogh & hmog ick pug eh nche ebag ot eb v 
joram lMbrp nly ti asw evn dictcr ot heh ghtr rties. ey Ancded 
lla tghn heh ugrf het keyon. hnny iKerw. in VazoOn uv spAz 
ah’s ee ‘ook up an ays yr bitder guLpIng sum u pulLs. ig jis see 
kHe nig MiSSy heh d sogA chHooPp & abhor ih cN gt eGulfer 
ee mattripg40
Perloff tells us that, in Bernstein’s business poems, the enemy is the media and 
all systems of data processing that “suppress ‘redundancy’ or ‘noise’” in favor of 
a totalitarian monologism. Faced with the mechanical binarism and routinization 
of computer systems, a Language poet like Bernstein will create a linguistic and 
cultural countercurrent. Perloff writes,
The poetic function, in this scheme of things, subordinates 
the informational axis (language used as a pure instrument 
of efficient communication) to what we might call the axis of 
redundancy, “meanings” now being created by all those elements 
of reference that go beyond the quantifiable communication of 
data from A to B.41
The informational axis, like the grammatical axis, is subjected, in this kind of 
Language poetry, to the noise axis, which corresponds to the syntagmatic. In 
McCaffery’s reading of Bernstein’s poem, whatever this text tries to mean is 
accompanied by a great deal of waste that, to the degree that it is not useful or 
recuperable as meaning, exemplifies the general economy of language. To begin 
with, this text is sufficiently “English” so that it is not completely separate from a 
restrictive economy, which is an economy of energy conservation and exchange. 
With respect to the form of expression, there is, in the materiality of the words 
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and word cognates, certain resemblances that loop back to meaningful language 
forms. Here we recognize the word “abhor” and cognates of other ordinary words, 
and the more words we recognize the greater our urge to interpret (to form, that 
is, our own restrictive economies). To do so we would then have to sift through 
the relentless lexical and typographical anomalies. Starting perhaps with “abhor,” 
meanings would accumulate, perhaps to the point where we might hazard an 
overall interpretation. The text baits us in our interpretive habit, and much of 
the interest and even pleasure of the text is registering the suspicious “words” 
that even suggest a cryptography and a cipher, lexemes like “dictcr” “‘ook up,” 
“guLpIng,” “MiSSy,” and so forth. McCaffery himself focuses on “in VazoOn uv 
spAz” as “‘invasion of space.’”42
But of course McCaffery’s point is that meaning’s advance and withdrawal 
prevents “all certainty of meaning.” As McCaffery puts it, the text displays
a regulating, conservational disposition that limits and organizes 
the independent letters, pushing them toward the word as a 
component in the articulated production and accumulation of 
meaning, and the other disposition that drives the letters into 
nonsemantic material ensembles that yield no profit.
Language’s dispositions tend in different directions, first toward meaning as a 
restrictive economy and second toward its nonmeaningful productivity, the 
general economy, which arises at the very instant it is trying to mean. The lure 
of interpretation may keep us interested; however, McCaffery’s point is that, 
while lexemes and lexical cognates, or typography, may “mean” at the particle 
level, the passage does not communicate a message but instead effects overall 
the “general rematerialization of language.” McCaffery writes, for example, that 
“Capitalization here serves no grammatical purpose but is simply a fortuitous 
registry of eruption at the meeting of the linguistic sign with its unincorporatable 
materiality.”43 That eruption is the appearance in our field of reading and 
interpreting of that in language writing which is unassimilable, impermeable, but 
also irrepressible: it is the infusion of the general economy into our own reading 
practice.
Affectively, what happens is suggested by Bernstein in his description of the 
poems of Leslie Scalapino:
it is the rhythm created by permutating the attentional beams, the 
chordal patterns created by her serial scannings, that create the 
musical coherence that takes the work beyond any distancing 
or dislocating devices that serve to build it. The refusal to be 
absorbed in any single focus on a situation gives way to a 
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multifocused absorption that eerily shifts, as an ambiguous 
figure, from anxious to erotic to diffident to hypnotic.
The eerie shifts—ambiguity, anxiety, eroticism, diffidence, hypnosis—are all 
responses of an affective kind, any one of them too inchoate to describe as an 
emotion. The goal of Language poetry of this kind is to maintain an affective flight 
along the border between meaning and the general economy, even as it erodes the 
border. Bernstein says “the reader stays plugged into the wave-like pulse of the 
writing. In other words, you keep moving through the writing without having to 
come up for ideational air; the ideas are all inside the process.”44 As we have seen, 
Wellman’s bad-writing plays demonstrate or feint toward meaning repeatedly and 
even repeat the same gesture, but meaning is never fully produced. There is the 
intensity of recognition in the meaning that comes into view, and the intensity 
of its immediate withdrawal, what Wellman means in referring to the “pulled 
punch”: he writes that “[a]n incomplete action figures forth a shadow, or limb, 
that completes itself variously—like the flinch response to a pulled punch—in the 
imaginary space of an audience member’s consciousness.”45 The unkept promise 
of the incomplete proposition is a residual question or mystery. In this testimony, 
the incoherence of the signs and the theatrical effects lead to a spectatorly 
absorption over the course of the performance in the ephemeral impressions 
made by repetitions and other recognitions over time. Wellman’s “pulled punch” 
describes the gesture in which, in lieu of recognition and understanding, the 
spectator experiences the affective intensity of meaning denied or deferred and 
supplanted, in the next instance, by a different feint toward meaning.
Bernstein identifies the affects produced this way as “absorption” and 
“impermeability”: the first, absorption, he writes, is “engrossing, engulfing / 
completely, engaging, arresting attention, reverie / attention intensification, 
rhapsodic, spellbinding, / mesmerizing, hypnotic, total, riveting, / enthralling: 
belief, conviction, silence.” The second, impermeability, includes “artifice, 
boredom, / exaggeration, attention scattering, distraction, / digression, interruptive, 
transgressive, / undecorous, anticonventional, unintegrated, fractured, / 
fragmented” and so forth. These affects form, Bernstein says, poetry’s “outer 
limit” and its “inner limit”: in other words, they are constraints on poetic response 
in the relative absence of meaning. In the relative absence of meaning, absorption 
and impermeability’s “intersection,” interface, or phase space is, Bernstein says, 
“flesh,”46 and in this way he suggests that the individual’s recourse is to bodily 
rhythms, with which absorption and impermeability are involved. As limits, these 
affects form the range of affect’s variability over the course of a reading or a spell 
of spectatorship: they form the bounds of chaos along a line running parallel with 
the flow of the general economy. In this chaotic system, meaning’s emergence and 
withdrawal can contribute to either absorptive or impermeable effects. Meaning 
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is essential as an intensifier so long as its subordination to the nonmeaningful 
production of affect can be maintained.
McCaffery and Bernstein theorize the affective flow produced by Language 
poetry in terms of the forms of expression of the general economy of language 
and the reader’s contrasting dispositions toward and away from meaning. The 
Language poet agitates language with a cascade of meaningless and radioactive 
expressions that together sustain for a time an affective, rather than meaningful 
or emotional, intensity. The result is an affective and wasteful flow which 
develops only when power is prevented from enforcing a relation of nonrelation 
between expression, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, official discourse, 
including narratives and generic codes. Meaning forms when expression 
corresponds transparently with official discourse. Meaning forms when, owing 
to this transparency, an enunciation, always a pragmatic singularity, is made 
through repetition to appear to transcend its moment to take the form of truth. 
Language poetry reverses this process by denying expression its transparency, by 
supplanting repetition and the illusion of transcendence with variation in a series 
of enunciations, each a singular occasion for the contrastive dispositions toward 
and away from meaning with absorptive and alienating effects. These dispositions 
produce a flow of affect, owing to the recurrent pulled punch of meaning, which 
erodes the border between the general and restrictive economies.
Writing to the General Economy and Writing to Rule
This interplay between the general economy and a restrictive economy is the 
theoretical basis for a nonmetaphorical description of chaos writing offered by 
McCaffery and assented to by Bernstein. But what is gained, then, by identifying 
Language writing with a nonlinear complex system? Bernstein is—and is not—
“suggesting that poetics, or poetry, is a chaotic system.” He writes that poetry 
is produced by, and complexly related to, a chaotic system. Poetry “charts the 
turbulent phenomenon known as human being, must reflect this in the nonperiodic 
flow of its ‘chaotic’ prosody.” Poetry, “in its most ecstatic manifestation,” is 
indeed a chaotic or “nonlinear dynamic system.” As a chaotic system, poetry is 
“constrained . . . controllable not in its flowering but in the progression toward 
chaos or move backward out of it: perhaps this is the narrative of a poem that 
poetics can address.”47 At most, Bernstein suggests that a chaotic prosody is set 
going by a combination of aesthetic and referential features, but its “flowering” 
is beyond apprehension, to say nothing of analysis. What actually goes on in the 
consciousness of a reader or spectator, once he or she has reached the “flinch” 
plateau under the incessant impact of pulled punches, is unknown.
If this affective flight of language is unknowable, this fact would have 
important implications for understanding the relationship of chaos theory to a 
reading of Wellman’s plays. At the moment when he turns to chaos theory, 
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Wellman writes of the plays’ “fractal” nature.48 In terms of the affective process 
just described,
1) the (always singular) enunciation, “radioactive” with meaning, is 
affectively intense more than it is meaningful; 
2) owing to the chaos of the meanings of the enunciation, the whole ideological 
order (form of content) is not repeated. What is repeatable, with variation, is the 
degree of chaos;
3) the repetition of a degree of chaos (the fractal)49 is always the repetition of 
the constraints on the singular enunciation, which include the form of content (the 
ideological order) and the contents of expression (rhetoric, grammar, body, voice, 
gesture, theatrical production, institutionality) imposed upon the enunciation.
Expression is the most variable, while in each new enunciation, the same 
constraints are operative: the fractal degree of chaos, with some variation from 
enunciation to enunciation, is maintained. This degree of chaos, registered as 
affective intensity, is the degree of openness in the relation of nonrelation between 
expression and content. There is no way to measure this degree, except, perhaps, 
by wiring spectators to medical equipment to arrive at some kind of somatic 
signature. We infer from science that this degree of chaos, whatever it is, is self-
similar from enunciation to enunciation, and from scale to scale, beginning with 
the (corrupted) lexeme and continuing to include the play itself. That the degree 
of chaos, as an aspect of reception, is unmeasurable is certainly suggested when 
Hayles herself makes no attempt to measure it. Hayles stresses the importance 
of “recursive symmetries”50 and the manner in which constraints feed back into 
each step in the writing and reading processes. She writes of the fundamental 
importance of ethics in the opening or closing of the writing procedure.51 Yet she 
never goes further in her description of chaos than to say that the text, in a given 
phase, is or is not complex.
I have suggested that the Language poets, and Wellman in Cellophane and 
Terminal Hip, exploit the gap between expression and content to give materiality 
back to expression and to resist the suppression of expression in the service of 
meaning and power. The reader’s and spectator’s dispositions toward and away 
from meaning maintain an affective intensity. There is, in fact, no part of this 
model that is knowable except the features of the text or performance, although, 
as has been noted, Bernstein feels that poetics can describe in general the way that 
chaos in poetry comes into being. Wellman writes to the general economy in his 
bad-writing plays of the late 1980s and early 1990s: Cellophane, Terminal Hip, 
and to a great degree in Three Americanisms. He writes to rule in plays such as 
Cat’s Paw (1995).
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A well-known example of writing to rule is offered by Perloff in Radical 
Artifice (1991), in which she discusses performances of John Cage’s Lecture 
on the Weather, once in 1984 in California and again in 1989 in Maryland. 
Perloff discusses both Cage’s procedure and her observation of the audience’s 
unconscious, somatic group response to the inclement “weather” to which Cage 
subjected it. Perloff, in ways implicitly unacceptable to McCaffery and Bernstein, 
suggests that the effects she describes were caused by the operation of Cage’s 
procedure. His goal, according to Perloff, was to bypass the law in the name of 
“discovery” because, as he says, “Of all professions the law is the least concerned 
with aspiration. It is concerned with precedent, not with discovery.” Using a 
“strictly planned mathematical system,” Cage extracts passages from the writings 
of Henry David Thoreau. Cage desires to use Thoreau’s writings, in Perloff’s 
words, to “[pay] homage to the qualities of American ingenuity, pragmatism, and 
good sense epitomized for Cage in the person of Thoreau” while avoiding the 
law (“precedent”) in the form of meaning. By employing a mathematical system 
for selecting texts from Thoreau, except for selecting the archive on which this 
system operates to begin with, Cage effaces himself and confounds the law’s 
operation through him, in the form of interpretation, aesthetic response, and so 
forth. As Perloff explains, the fixed rule of this mathematical system helped Cage 
to evade himself as a human system so that Thoreau’s language could be offered 
to an assembly of other people with diminished mediation. Perloff writes that 
the performance of Lecture on the Weather “functions as a ‘strange attractor’ or 
‘unpredictable system’” so that, she continues, “[t]he performance . . . is not about 
[does not represent] the weather; it is weather.” Perloff writes, “the ‘lecture’ on 
the weather turns the simulated event into a real one, causing the audience to take 
shelter from the cruel elements.” In California, she says, the audience, arranged 
in some disorder in the space, responded to the storm in an interesting way. She 
reports that “[b]y the time the storm ‘broke,’ lightning flashes appearing on the 
large screen in the form of briefly projected negatives of drawings by Thoreau, 
the audience had become something of a football huddle. Everyone wanted to 
join together to get out of the storm.”52 Here the question is not so much the 
audience’s behavior, but how much a mathematical procedure had to do with 
it. Certainly Cage, in Perloff’s account, took every measure, within the rules he 
made, to eliminate himself from the equation as a subject, and Perloff describes 
the audience less as subjects, than as a statistical mass—a “huddle.” Yet the causal 
connection between Cage’s procedure and the group response to ordinary stimuli 
remains vague and probably insupportable. After all, the mathematical procedure 
used in arranging Thoreau’s writings cannot determine how spectators process 
Thoreau’s language in its radioactivity. McCaffery takes issue with the tendency 
of a rule, as a writing procedure, to maintain the author-subject as author of the 
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rule and agent of its implementation. Of Ron Silliman’s similarly procedural 
poem Ketjak, McCaffery writes,
What is striking . . . is the work’s double orientation toward, 
on the one hand, a textual production through a “random” 
economy or a free play of signification . . . and on the other 
hand an accumulative, preservational movement committed 
to the noncontamination of a transcendental “procedure” that 
seems precisely modeled on the Hegelian aufhebung [sublation, 
transcendence, or synthesis] and permits the structure to 
foreground itself as a first-order attention.
There is in the authorship, in other words, no erosion of the borders between 
the general economy and the procedure, which, as a transcendent fabrication, 
in theory would not really achieve the subject’s effacement or dissolution of 
self-consciousness. In other words, from the standpoint of authorship, it is a 
restrictive economy, one that does not deliver the consciousness of the spectator 
to the affective nonmeaning of the general economy. A page earlier, McCaffery 
writes that “[c]rucial in Hegel’s argument is the inviolable, irreducible status of 
self-consciousness itself. Transgression and the negative in the Hegelian system 
do not risk the loss of the subject.” Regarding Cage, McCaffery groups him 
with Silliman, noting that “[t]his Hegelian aspect applies to most instances of 
procedural writing.”53 It is suggested, then, that the encounter between the general 
economy and a mathematically sustained, “Hegelian” restrictive economy does 
not risk the subject as author in the writing. If Cage’s Lecture on the Weather 
did indeed, through the performance’s absorptive and impermeable effects, risk 
the subjectivity of the spectator, the mathematical procedure or rule may have 
operated for Cage mostly as an especially disciplined form of bad writing. 
Nor is the subject, either of author or spectator, at risk in Wellman’s Cat’s 
Paw: A Meditation on the Don Juan Theme.54 Begun in 1995 and first staged in 
2000, Cat’s Paw is written according to rule even as it produces self-similarity 
as a metaphor. Like Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia (1993), the playwright’s intentions 
are clearly heuristic, so that, where chaos is concerned, the play serves more as a 
model of certain chaotic principles than, like the bad-writing plays, as an actual 
means of producing chaos. Arcadia was, Demastes tells us, “the first mainstream 
theatre product consciously designed to be a ‘chaos’ play.” Stoppard’s play is 
said to be arranged on the principle of fractal self-similarity, which means that 
the same fractal shape or formula occurs on different scales. Plays written on 
this principle are thought to be formally nonlinear to suggest the chaotic lives 
and feelings of individual persons. Concerning Arcadia, Demastes writes, “In the 
play, we have instances of self-similar repetition between 1809 and 1993, between 
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leaf and park, between the formation of Thomasina’s leaf and Bernard’s Byron 
story, between Septimus’s hermit project and Valentine’s computer calculations.” 
That is, the parallels are apparently significant. Demastes continues: “[e]ven the 
algorithmic graphing of the leaf (the smallest-scale system in the play) finds self-
similar parallels in the very nonlinear, seemingly chaotic structure of the play (the 
largest scale system).”55 But for all the talk of mathematics, Demastes is correct to 
point to the metaphoricity of this kind of play. Dramaturgically, such a chaos play 
seems to involve fashioning parallels for the mind, the principal excitement being 
in contemplating this new chaos paradigm. 
Wellman’s Cat’s Paw is also a meditation on fractal self-similarity and, while 
Wellman more or less follows a rule he has made for himself, the play is one of 
the more realistic and linear plays in his oeuvre. Although this is a Don Juan play, 
Wellman’s self-imposed rule is that no men will appear in the play and that the 
women will not discuss men in the play. Men, especially as agents of abuse of 
women, are a present absence, introduced most apparently through references 
to experiences so traumatic for the women (occurring in Bermuda, Caracas, and 
Singapore), that they are the last thing the women wish to talk about. The parallels 
between traumas and the vertical, gravity-prone settings in which these scenes 
take place (the observation decks of the Empire State Building and of the World 
Trade Center; the fist of the Statue of Liberty, where Jo takes her daughter Lindsey 
by evading the guards; and the hallway of the court building during a hearing on 
Jo’s trespass the scene before) provide a linear restaging of similar conflicts among 
characters. Lindsey, too young to have had her Don Juan event, is brimming with 
Young Republican aspiration, while the adult women, systemically complicated 
by their Don Juan events, range in dispositional polarity from the paranoid Jane 
to her ex-hippy mother, who embraced her Don Juan moment in a conscious 
pursuit of depravity. “Depravity,” she says, “was my object.”56 Jane’s mother is 
sufficiently self-aware to observe that she is herself “unself-similar”57 and thus 
unlike her self-similar daughter, who wears men’s clothes and who, ironically, 
seems much more constrained in her artsy New York City milieu than her mother 
is in Iowa. Jane’s mother says, “I feel rich and full and large with hopefulness, 
blood, and a sense of true being.” Even in her depravity she was, she says, “true 
to my nature, and to the clothes I wore.”58 The suggestion seems to be, not that 
Jane’s mother is free from constraint, but that her fractal evolution (variation in 
repetition) has been different from that of anyone else in the play, which makes 
her in that dramatic context capable of radically troubling her daughter and the 
worldview with which she is associated. Again, the play presents chaos mostly as 
a metaphor, the no-man rule notwithstanding.
Conclusion: Back to the Theatre
More relentlessly than Cat’s Paw and many other plays, Cellophane and 
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Terminal Hip constrain the body by greatly reducing extra linguistic theatrical 
potential in order to exploit the radioactivity of language. These plays were part of 
another Wellman experiment. If Wellman may have been in some sense a Language 
poet all along, the bad-writing experiment brought the poet fully out of the closet. 
He chose not to take this particular form very far. I have tried here to describe the 
nonmeaningful exploitation of the radioactivity of language, and, provisionally, its 
production of an affective state of intensity. Of course the style can be frustrating to 
those insistent on meaning. “When Terminal Hip appeared in 1992, a Los Angeles 
Times reviewer concluded, “it may be hip, but why bother and who cares?”59 Yet 
eight years later, a second Los Angeles reviewer wrote that there “emerges [a] 
different kind of sense . . . if you concede the all-but-futile battle of trying the parse 
[the] monologue for linear semantic content, and instead let Wellman’s recurring 
imagery and the carefully crafted mood shifts in James Martin’s staging guide the 
experience.”60 They know that they often must preach to the converted. McCaffery 
writes that “THE TEXTUAL INTENTION PRESUPPOSES READERS WHO 
KNOW THE LANGUAGE CONSPIRACY IN OPERATION.”61 This raises 
important questions about the institutional constraints on artistic power. The butterfly 
effect of avant-gardism has yet to be conclusively established. Meanwhile, I hope 
I have shown that in the 1990s the Language poets inhabited the same discursive 
formation as deconstruction and chaos theory, two isomorphic systems. All three 
were in some sense radioactive, i.e., complex mutual intensifiers, especially for 
those who needed to appropriate them to imagine an escape from the postmodern. 
The radioactive or theoretical relation of nonrelation characterizing this discursive 
(or antidiscursive) formation of expression (Language poetry, deconstruction, chaos 
theory) engaged with postmodern forms of content to express the impulse to escape. 
This escape entailed no physical relocation but productive engagement (if that were 
possible) with the bad infinity of reified postmodern culture. Bernstein’s “poetics” 
tells us that Language poetry, in the end, exists “to provoke response and to evoke 
company.”62 The modesty of the Language poets’ claims is striking, as is the note 
of piety, because nothing is guaranteed. Meanwhile, Wellman’s theatre remains, 
in its affective intensity, a “theatre of wonders.”63
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